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As China has increased its aid, trade, investments, market share, and influence 
in the countries of Africa, there has been scant attention paid to the role of Chi-
nese financial institutions. When a major China-Africa deal is announced, in 
which a generalized “China” has an agreement with an African country for a 
stupendous amount of money, the particulars of that deal are seldom revealed. 
For example, when the Financial Times reports on April 28, 2015 that “China 
rail group signs $5.5bn in Africa deals”, it is only in the sixth paragraph that the 
reader learns that “[China Railway Construction Corp] said financing for its rail 
project had not been finalised.” China is not making these deals but rather Chi-
nese companies and individuals are; they are able to do so because of Chinese 
financing and Chinese policy banks. However, there is not as much literature 
specifically on these policy banks and how they relate to Africa-China relations. 
Thankfully, veteran reporters Henry Sanderson and Michael Forsythe have giv-
en readers an incredible resource in China’s Superbank: Debt, Oil and Influence 
- How China Development Bank is Rewriting the Rules of Finance, which offers 
a detailed and insightful look at one of the most powerful financial institutions 
in the world: the Chinese Development Bank (CDB). 
The popular narrative is that China is a more flexible and less ideologically 
rigid partner for African countries than the United States and European coun-
tries. Superbank opens with a revealing anecdote that complicates that story: 
former CDB Chairman Chen Yuan meeting with former Venezuelan president 
Hugo Chavez and handing him “a 600-page book filled with recommendations 
on how Chávez should run, manage, and build ports, roads, and railroads” (pix). 
Chinese financing is often seen as “no-strings attached”; however, this is not 
quite true: countries cannot diplomatically recognize Taiwan, for example, and 
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the loans have to go to Chinese companies, contractors, and subcontractors. 
On top of that, Chinese policy banks do give policy recommendations to 
foreign governments in order to make those countries more attractive for CDB 
financing. 
The CDB and their generous loans are not the product of clever, farsighted 
Chinese Communist officials or ideology. Rather, they are the product of the 
aforementioned Chen Yuan’s singular vision to turn a Soviet-style lending in-
stitution into a strong, modern financial tool of the Chinese state, sometimes 
against the wishes the Chinese government itself, as he has sought to make the 
bank profitable and not just a cashier for government officials. Superbank does 
an excellent job of demonstrating how Chen’s background and beliefs were 
what drove the success of the bank. Through the 1990s, Chinese banks were in 
spectacular disarray: “To understand how bad it was, in the late 1990s, [non-per-
forming loans] in the Chinese banking system made up 40 percent of total lend-
ing. Globally, having less than 5 percent of lending nonperforming is considered 
good health” (p55). The focus on Chen and his belief that urbanization was the 
key to a growing economy is extremely useful for the reader, as a lot of the 
English-speaking world tends to have a limited understanding of Chinese poli-
cymakers and how they shape Chinese policies as individuals. 
Crucially, how did China actually promote growth and how did it get the 
money to do so? There is no shortage of policymakers who want a growing 
economy, after all. The CDB’s most notable growth vehicle was tied to China’s 
stimulus response to the 1998 Asian financial crisis, whereby Chinese local gov-
ernments created economic entities called local government financing vehicles 
(LGVFs) that were funded by the CDB. Local governments and state-owned 
enterprises were heavily in debt and had limited opportunities for financing as 
no commercial banks would lend to them, so the CDB would buy that bad debt 
as well as the debt of local state-owned companies, and then pump money into 
the LGVF for specific urbanization projects, which resulted in domestic infra-
structure and real estate. The CDB itself raised money by floating bonds on the 
bond market, which can only be sold to banks and, quite conveniently, the Chi-
nese government instructs banks to buy those bonds. Most importantly, LGVF’s 
are only economically viable if the land upon which all the infrastructure and 
housing is built increases in value.
It is on this point that Superbank distinguishes itself in terms of its economic 
analysis. Much of the building boom of the 1990s onward only makes financial 
sense if land is flipped from farmer to developer so that the government can give 
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land to developers at heavily discounted rates and share in the profits of Chinese 
real estate. “As CDB had done overseas with oil, land-revenue streams can be 
used to secure loans, with the debt service paid off by land sales whose value is 
supposed to increase thanks to the infrastructure financed by the loans…” (p19). 
The overall economic system works, but it does create difficulties for people 
who initially lived on the land, usually poorly-compensated farmers, some of 
whom are interviewed in the book. The fact that Superbank gives voice to their 
frustrations with the system is important and a necessary counter to the often 
exuberant descriptions of Chinese financing mechanisms. The CDB is built on 
a financial system that is quite complicit in causing suffering to a large number 
of Chinese people. That does not mean that this system is bad, as most Chinese 
people, even those relocated, can point to their lives being materially better than 
they were before, but this complication is almost never acknowledged in discus-
sions of Chinese policy banks.
So how does this text fit into broader China-Africa scholarship? Superbank 
has one chapter dedicated to the topic in “Nothing to Lose but our Chains: China 
Development Bank in Africa,” which looks at how the CDB interfaces with Chi-
na-Africa relations, specifically through its private equity arm the China-Africa 
Development Fund (CADF). In addition, the fourth chapter “Risk versus Re-
ward” offers a fascinating look at the CDB and Venezuela, and is also a valuable 
read for Sino-Africanists. The CADF “takes only minority stakes in projects 
alongside other Chinese investors and aims for Chinese firms to give capital and 
technology as well as experience to local partners – much as did foreign firms 
in China’s development” (p98). Rather than simply list projects, deals, or gov-
ernment pronouncements, this chapter looks into the aforementioned individual 
projects and tries to explain their relative success or failure. When a Chinese 
glass factory in Ethiopia that received funding from the CADF was visited by 
the former Ethiopian president Meles Zenawi as well as the Chinese ambassa-
dor in 2009 and declared a symbol of Ethiopia-China cooperation, what does it 
mean that the same factory lies empty and unused in 2012? “It will reopen with 
lower production and was too ambitious, according to [Chief Executive Officer 
of the CADF] Chi [Jianxin]. It was expected to produce 40,000 tons of glass per 
year, but that was too much for the local market, which can use only 20,000 tons 
a year, Chi explained” (p100).
China-Africa business difficulties are not new. The differences in culture, lan-
guage, labor relations, etc. are significant barriers for Chinese enterprises in 
Africa, which many do overcome. However, a lot less is known about the health 
of China’s loans in Africa. Specific to the CADF, “Chi Jianxin, in an interview, 
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was less sanguine. The fund [as of 2012] has not been able to exit any of its in-
vestments, he said. Although it is still seeking a ‘beneficial result’ over the long 
term. It generates enough cash flow to maintain its operations and has made a 
small profit” (p97). There are countless China-Africa success stories, including 
the famous Huajian shoe factory in the outskirts of Addis Ababa, which is pro-
filed in Superbank, and CBD loans are overall “advantageous” (p116) for Afri-
can governments and institutions. Yet there is scant information on the success 
and failures of individual loans, which are the vehicles that drive much of the 
current China-Africa relationship. Superbank allows the reader to better under-
stand the CBD and ask questions about the sustainability of such financing. The 
picture of Chinese policy that emerges is one of nuance and texture, of individ-
ual policymakers, of profit and loss, of an uncertain future. 
Like the local governments in China, when governments of Africa and Latin 
America borrow from CDB, they are borrowing from the sovereign. The pen-
alty for not paying back the loan is likely to be more difficult and catastrophic 
than not paying back a Western bank. For a decade, China’s two main policy 
banks, Exim Bank and CDB, have monopolized overseas lending. When Chen 
Yuan travels overseas to Africa or Latin America, he sits at the front of gov-
ernment delegations next to the top Communist Party official – surely a visual 
symbol to poorer borrowers with weaker institutions that they are dealing with 
the might of the party, which has uncontested power over the second largest 
economy in the world. Many of CDB’s loans are tied to short-term indices, such 
as six-month LIBOR, which can rise quickly as Africa found out in the 1980s. 
Africa may need to broaden its sources of capital to other emerging counties, 
such as Brazil and India, who are increasingly offering competition to China’s 
lending (p117).
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